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D Hulme* 
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1 Introduction 
 
Part One of this article traced the current rising tensions between the South African 
executive and the judiciary on the question of the separation of powers. The present 
situation in South Africa was then contrasted and compared with a clash which took 
place between the executive and judiciary in 17th century England. The broad 
implications of the clash between the English King James I and his Chief Justice 
Edward Coke were set out, together with their relevance to present-day South Africa. 
 
In Part Two of this article the implications of the clash between James and Coke will 
be examined in greater detail. The important cases of Prohibitions Del Roy and The 
Case of Proclamations will be discussed, following which comparisons will be drawn 
with the current South African situation. The arguments put forward in these 
important cases will be linked to the contemporary anti-majoritarian thesis of Ronald 
Dworkin.   
 
                                                          
1  The phrase 'Vox Populi? Vox Humbug!' used in the title of this article is borrowed from William 
Tecumseh Sherman, the American Civil War general who used it in relation to press reporting. It 
is adapted from the ancient adage 'Vox populi, vox Dei' - 'The voice of the people [is] the voice of 
God', the origins of which are uncertain. However, an early example of its use was by Alcuin in 
798 AD (Wikiquotes Date Unknown en.wikipedia.org  
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2  The case of Prohibitions Del Roy 1607 
 
Prohibitions Del Roy2 is a seminal case, as it sets a precedent for the judicial review 
of executive action, and is uncompromising on the question of the separation of 
powers in relation to the courts. Remarkably, it achieved this in an era when neither 
the tenure nor indeed the head of a judge was secure. The judge in this matter was 
Sir Edward Coke, a personality of enormous importance in Anglo-American 
constitutional history. Notwithstanding the fact that the decision in the case 
represents a practical validation of the separation of powers, Coke did not endorse 
any discernible concept of the separation of powers or even constitutionalism for that 
matter.3 Coke's approach to constitutional issues is rather typical of English 
constitutional history, which tends to be 'short' on theory and 'long' on precedent.4 At 
the time of the Del Roy case in 1607, Edward Coke was Chief Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas. In 1612 he was 'promoted' to be chief justice of the King's Bench in 
order to remove him from the Court of Common Pleas, where his decisions had 
displeased King James. Coke was finally dismissed by James in 1616 for his various 
attempts to limit James' use of the royal prerogative. Later, as a member of 
parliament Coke was to clash with the monarch again, and was briefly imprisoned in 
the Tower of London for his activities. It was as an MP in 1628 that Coke was to draft 
the 'Petition of Right', another of the primary documents of English constitutional law, 
and its production constituted one of the steps in the path leading to the English Civil 
War of 1642-1651.5 
 
                                                          
2  Prohibitions Del Roy 1607 77 ER 1342. 
3  Stoner Common Law 27-29.  
4  It is characteristic of English constitutional law that very few of its innovations or developments 
were based on principle or considered in advance. Whilst constitutional institutions, rights and 
liberties certainly were created, developed or extended, the process tended to be more 
concerned with 'correcting manifest wrongs than proclaiming evident rights'. See Ackroyd History 
of England 173. Doctrine emerged piecemeal and in retrospect. For instance, Magna Carta was 
a 'miscellaneous and haphazard collection of principles taken from canon law and common law 
and custom equally', containing no central doctrine and designed to deal with the specific abuses 
of John I. See Ackroyd History of England 173. Furthermore, much occurred as a result of 
chance events rather than planning based on principle. There are many examples, but they 
include the subsequent survival of Magna Carta after its creation in 1215, and the creation of the 
House of Commons by Simon De Montfort in 1265. See Hindley Magna Carta xvii; Ackroyd 
History of England 172-174; 199-200.  
5  Stoner Common Law 15-16. Coke's earlier career included service as an MP and speaker of the 
House of Commons, as well as Attorney General under both Elizabeth I and James. His activities 
in the latter office included the prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh. By the time of the Petition of 
Right, the monarch was James' son Charles I.  
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Coke was a somewhat contradictory, if not controversial figure, referred to by 
contemporaries as 'tough old Coke'.6 His world view was shaped by a profound 
fascination with that combination of 'reason and authority' which in his mind 
comprised the English Common Law,7 together with a passionate belief in the 
liberties of England as contained in Magna Carta.8 He wrote his own treatise on the 
Common Law, in what he called the 'Institutes'. 
 
Prohibitions Del Roy involves what would now be called a declarator.9 It seems that 
a matter involving a land dispute was heard by the king, who had given judgment. 
This judgment was later 'repealed', as the hearing of such a matter by the king 'did 
not belong to the common law'. No indication is given of which court reversed the 
judgment. Nonetheless, the reversal resulted in the king's seeking clarity with regard 
to his authority to hear cases and give judgment in legal disputes. Before 
approaching the courts for clarity, James had obtained advice regarding his judicial 
powers from Richard Bancroft, the Archbishop of Canterbury. This advice was much 
to the King's liking, namely: 10 
 
Concerning the high commission11 or in any other case in which there is not 
express authority in law, the King himself may decide it in his Royal person; and 
that the Judges are but the delegates of the King, and that the King may take what 
causes he shall please to determine, from the determination of the Judges, and 
may determine them himself. And the Archbishop said, that this was clear in 
divinity, that such authority belongs to the King by the word of God in the Scripture. 
 
This view, as can be seen from the 'Trew Law' extract quoted in Part One of this 
article, is in keeping with the manner in which James viewed the function of judges. 
                                                          
6  Stoner Common Law 16. 
7  Stoner Common Law 23. 
8  Stoner Common Law 21. 
9  Because of the setting, which appears to have been James' court rather than in a formal tribunal, 
the case has the appearance of an opinion rather than a formal court pronouncement. However, 
it was not unusual at the time for officials to exercise their functions for the convenience of the 
monarch, in his presence.  
10  Prohibitions Del Roy 1607 77 ER 1342. Note that early cases such as Prohibtions Del Roy lack 
any system of paragraph referencing.  
11  The High Commission together with the infamous Court of the Star Chamber were the two 
special courts of prerogative - the High Commission for ecclesiastical matters and the Star 
Chamber designed to try certain offences using less formal procedure than the common law 
courts. An extension of the Privy Council, the Star Chamber, tended to be used for certain 
charges against high-ranking members of society. In Stuart times, the Star Chamber came to be 
abused as a secretive court in which the opponents of the monarch were prosecuted with little 
chance of acquittal. See Britannica Date Unknown www.britannica.com. See also Prosser and 
Sharp Short Constitutional History 114-116. 
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He was supported in this view by certain courtiers, including none other than Francis 
Bacon, who was made Attorney General in 1613, and later made Lord Chancellor in 
1618. Bacon contended that judges should be 'lions under the throne'.12 
 
Chief Justice Coke, with the support of the other judges,13 expressed his surprise at 
the Archbishop's advice - citing authority to the contrary. Regarding the monarch's 
judicial powers, Coke made the following three points:14 First, the King "in his own 
person" was ineligible to hear any matter in any court of justice. In these courts 
judgment had to be given by the judges "according to the law and custom of 
England". Secondly, however, the king had a limited judicial role when sitting in the 
Upper House of Parliament. In the House of Lords, provided he had the assent of the 
"Lords Spiritual and Temporal", he could reverse a decision of the King's Bench on 
appeal.15 Thirdly, Coke held that the king could sit in the Court of the Star Chamber, 
"but this was to consult with the justices, upon certain questions proposed to them, 
and not in judicio".16 
 
In general, Coke relies on specific authorities for his pronouncements, although he 
extends the scope of the rule relied on in certain instances.17 In this practice his 
                                                          
12  Churchill History of the English Speaking Peoples.  
13  These presumably included the part-time judges of the Exchequer. Although Judge Coke was 
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas at the time, he asserts that "all the judges of 
England" were present at the time he rendered his opinion to King James; the implication being 
that this included not only the judges of the Court of Common Pleas but also the judges of the 
other 'superior' (or royal as opposed to local) court benches - although he might be referring only 
to the three Common Law Courts. Coke also asserts that all the judges were in agreement with 
his opinion. Coke exemplifies some of the matters which the king might not hear, and these 
include criminal offences which were beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas, 
indicating that Coke's judgment related to the court system as a whole and not merely to the 
court of which he was Chief Justice. 
14  Since in a sense the judgment deals with jurisdiction and only incidentally with the separation of 
powers, it is a little hard to understand without some knowledge of seventeenth century English 
court structure. The three English superior courts of Common Law at that time were the Court of 
Common Pleas, which dealt with private disputes between parties; the King's Bench, which dealt 
with criminal matters; and the Exchequer of Pleas, which dealt with financial matters - although 
the jurisdictional boundaries were somewhat blurred. The use of the common law in these courts 
contrasted with the practice of the Chancery, which with regard to its judicial duties became a 
court of equity. Other entities within the royal administration such as the Admiralty also 
possessed limited judicial authority. See Prosser and Sharp Short Constitutional History 41, 66, 
96.  
15  The situation was somewhat 'messy' to say the least, in that the areas of jurisdiction between the 
courts was by no means watertight, and the King's Bench acted as a court of appeal for the Court 
of Common Pleas.  
16  Prohibitions Del Roy 1607 77 ER 1342. 
17  Good examples are the 'due process' clauses in Magna Carta, which originally were intended to 
apply to 'free men' only and not to serfs; see inter alia, sections 20, 36, 38 and 39 of Magna 
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approach is probably both unwitting and correct, as rights had developed, extending 
beyond their original context throughout English history. Nevertheless it seems that 
Coke was not above 'gilding the lily' in his quest to assert that his authority was truly 
ancient. He claims that: 
 
... no King after the Conquest assumed to himself to give any judgment in any 
cause whatsoever, which concerned the administration of justice within this realm, 
but these were solely determined in the Courts of Justice...  
 
Interestingly, he does not cite any authority for this particular proposition - which is 
clearly wrong. In fact, the 11th and 12th century Norman and Angevin kings of 
England18 had no qualms about sitting in judgment, and the very name 'court' 
indicates the royal origin of the judicial organ of government. The king originally 
exercised all elements of governance; the executive, the legislative and, more 
particularly in this context, the judicial function in his royal court. It was only with the 
onset of judicial specialisation from the late 12th century as well as the early 13th 
century requirement in Magna Carta that the Court of Common pleas remain in one 
place instead of progressing with the king as part of his entourage - that the monarch 
began to separate himself from the judicial function.19 It is true that by 1607 the 
courts were separate from the executive, as Coke indicates, and, from Coke's 
perspective, had been so from time immemorial. Nonetheless, the separation of the 
executive function exercised on behalf of the person of the monarch from the judicial 
function had been a gradual development, a fact of which Coke may not have been 
aware. It is also possible that the mind-set of the judge prevented him from 
perceiving or admitting that this development had been gradual, as he tended to 
think on the basis of precedent rather than principle. At no point does the judge 
argue on the basis of the separation of powers, even though there is classical 
precedent for this.20 The theory had yet to be formulated on a formal basis, although 
as it will be seen from the 17th century cases under examination in this article, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Carta. Coke makes no such distinction when he refers to Magna Carta. In this he was not wrong, 
as the feudal society which Magna Carta strongly reflects no longer existed in the 17
th
 century, 
by which time Magna Carta was perceived to contain rights of general application. 
18  These monarchs began with William I in 1066 and ended arguably with the loss of the Angevin 
Empire and the death of John I in 1216, although the Angevin Plantagenets continued to rule 
England, its British dependencies, and the surviving Angevin territory - namely Gascony.  
19  See Prosser and Sharp Short Constitutional History 32, 37-43. See also article 17 of Magna 
Carta: "Common pleas shall not follow our court, but shall be held in some fixed place".  
20  Stoner Common Law 28. 
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concept already existed on a practical, if somewhat incomplete and contested basis 
in England at this time.21 Coke's arguments are not based on mere blind adherence 
to precedent, however. They are also based on reason and a practical application of 
the rule of law. 
 
Coke's deployment of reason in argument becomes more evident in his next 
pronouncement, which was that "the King cannot arrest any man..... for the party 
cannot have remedy against the King; so if the King give any judgment, what remedy 
can the party have". This is very close to arguing that the king may not be a judge in 
his own cause. Coke further asserts that for the same reason the king may not arrest 
anyone on suspicion of treason or felony. He also relies for authority on Magna 
Carta22 and other authorities including the statutes of Edward III, which provide for 
due process and presentment before justices prior to arrest.23  
 
The record of the case ends with a classic passage in defence of the rule of law: 
 
... then the King said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he 
and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to which it was answered by me, that 
true it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great 
endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of 
England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of 
his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and 
judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study and experience, 
before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it: that the law was the golden 
met-wand and measure to try the causes of the subjects; and which protected His 
Majesty in safety and peace: with which the King was greatly offended, and said, 
that then he should be under the law, which was treason to affirm, as he said; to 
which I said, that Bracton saith, quod Rex non debed esse sub homine, sed sub 
Deo et lege [That the King ought not to be under any man but under God and the 
law]. 
 
It is worth recalling that this pronouncement was made at a time when the precise 
limits of royal powers were contested, and the monarchy not above attempting to 
                                                          
21  It is for this reason that Montesquieu makes reference to England as an exemplifier of the 
concepts he has under discussion in Spirit of the Laws.  
22  Magna Carta, article 39: "No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in 
any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land." (In this instance the reference in the judgment is not 
specifically to article 39 of Magna Carta, but this passage would seem to be the best suited to 
Coke's argument).  
23  Arrest undoubtedly included incarceration - probably the real aspect of harm in any situation of 
arrest.  
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extend it illegally. Furthermore, as the abrupt termination of Coke's judicial career in 
1616 for crossing James one time too many illustrates, judges did not enjoy security 
of tenure.24 Finally, notwithstanding limited legal safeguards, at that time it was not 
uncommon for those who opposed the monarch to lose their heads. The statement 
encapsulates Coke's view of the value and role of law. Decisions made on the basis 
of Solomonic wisdom and reason on its own are essentially arbitrary, no matter how 
'endowed with excellent science, and great endowments of nature' the decision-
maker might be. To make a legal decision which conforms to law, the application of 
some objective criteria external to the decision-maker is required. For Coke, this 
'golden metwand' or measuring stick is the law. Courts do not make decisions by 
using natural reason but by application of a special 'artificial' reason. This is based 
on both a theoretical and practical knowledge of the law, which can be acquired only 
through "long study and experience" in its use. As will become apparent below, the 
concept of the law's acting as a 'golden metwand' lies at the root of contemporary 
arguments against simple majoritarian theories of democracy, and in favour of 
theories which promote constrained constitutional democracy.   
 
3 The Case of Proclamations 161125 
 
Proclamations del Roy was by no means the only case involving friction between 
Judge Coke and King James. The Case of Proclamations of 1610 did not involve a 
contest between the king and the courts over their respective powers or jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, like Del Roy it was an instance of the executive having its area of 
authority restricted to conform with what would now be referred to as the separation 
of powers. Furthermore, it was another example of the executive being frustrated in 
its intentions by the courts - a frustration which is apparently shared by the current 
South African executive.26  
                                                          
24  This would come only with the Act of Settlement of 1701 which, inter alia, provided for the 
independence of the judiciary by ensuring that judges might keep their appointments 'quamdiu se 
bene gesserint'. From this point on the monarch would not be able to remove them from the 
bench or interfere with their salaries. They might be removed from the bench only for bad 
behaviour and on the vote of a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament. 
25  The Case of Proclamations 1610 77 ER 1352. 
26  It is interesting to note that Coke was also involved in an important case concerning the judicial 
review of legislation. This was the well-known case of Thomas Bonham v College of Physicians 
1610 77 ER 638, 652 (CP). The latter case is controversial, as it includes passages such as the 
following: "… it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of 
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The case involved James' wishing to prohibit the construction of new buildings in and 
about London by way of proclamation. The issue was if it was permissible for the 
king to create legal prohibitions in this manner. Despite several instances of the 
king's ostensibly having made law by way of proclamation in the period before this 
matter came up for decision, the practice had been challenged. The king's advisors 
were clearly aware that it was legally questionable and also that a judicial decision 
endorsing the use of the practice in future would create a new precedent. Although 
the courts themselves appeared to have enforced such proclamations on occasion in 
the past, Coke pointed out that the indictments in such cases made reference to the 
law rather than any royal proclamation.27 In any event, as Coke noted, "melius est 
recurrere, quam male currere".28 In other words, that it would be better to reconsider 
any practices that had mistakenly arisen rather than to continue them in breach of 
the law. 
 
Coke wished to have time to confer with his brother judges and "then to make an 
advised answer according to law and reason". However, he was pressed by the 
king's advisors to deliver an immediate and supportive opinion, which Coke strongly 
resisted. Although his resistance to this pressure is of no immediate relevance to the 
case itself, it reveals Coke's approach to the creation of new precedents, which is 
germane to his approach to the law, and worth examining: 29   
  
The Lord Chancellor said, that every precedent had first a commencement, and that 
he would advise the Judges to maintain the power and prerogative of the King; and 
in cases in which there is no authority and precedent, to leave it to the King to order 
in it, according to his wisdom, and for the good of his subjects ... and all concluded 
that it should be necessary at that time to confirm the King's prerogative with our 
opinions, although that there were not any former precedent or authority in law: for 
every precedent ought to have a commencement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is 
against common right or reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law 
will controul it, and adjudge such Acts to be void ..." However, the meaning of Coke's words is 
contested with regard to whether he intended that legislation could be reviewed by the courts in 
the American fashion using the common law as a standard, or whether he merely intended 
review to be limited to the sort of grounds for review permitted in administrative law. This case 
was particularly influential in the early development of American jurisprudence.  
27  "... indictments conclude, contra leges et statuta; but I never heard an indictment to conclude, 
contra regiam proclamationem". 
28  A literal translation is: 'It is better to run back than to run badly'. An interpretation of the meaning 
would be: 'It is better to revise something than do it badly'. The authors express their heartfelt 
thanks to Professor John Hilton of the Department of Classics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
for his generous assistance with the translation. 
29  The literal meaning is: 'deliberation must be long for something that must be decided once'. 
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To which I answered, that true it is that every precedent hath a commencement; but 
when authority and precedent is wanting, there is need of great consideration, 
before that any thing of novelty shall be established, and to provide that this be not 
against the law of the land: for I said, that the King cannot change any part of the 
common law, nor create any offence by his proclamation, which was not an offence 
before, without Parliament. But at this time I only desired to have a time of 
consideration and conference with my brothers, for deliberandum est diu, quod 
statuendum est semel.  
 
Coke's resistance to being 'railroaded' into a quick decision and his insistence on 
being allowed to deliberate on the issues are perhaps one of the first examples of 
judicial resistance to an executive attempting to overstep the legitimate limits of its 
power. Furthermore, his insistence on deliberation before giving an immediate 
response and that 'any thing of novelty' should not contravene the law is entirely 
consistent with his view that law and reason ought to operate as a 'metwand'. His 
insistence that parliament should be the creator of any new law is also notable. If 
there was to be a 'metwand' that guided the decisions of the courts or the decisions 
of the executive for that matter, it ought not to be of the executive's construction. 
Neither should it be possible for the executive to amend the 'metwand.' Whatever 
else, it seems certain that Coke had no intention 'in cases in which there is no 
authority and precedent, to leave it to the King to order in it, according to his 
wisdom'. 
 
Having conferred with his brother judges, Coke found that: 30 
 
... the King by his proclamation of other ways cannot change any part of the 
common law, or statute law, or the customs of the realm, ... also the King cannot 
create any offence by his prohibition or proclamation, which was not an offence 
before, for that was to change the law, and to make an offence which was not; for 
ubi non est lex, ibi non est transgression: ergo, that which cannot be punished 
without proclamation, cannot be punished with it. 
 
Coke went on to indicate the role of royal proclamations, which it seems would be to 
serve more or less the purpose which regulations serve today. Therefore the King 
could set penalties provided the common law already provided that some activity 
                                                          
30  Although Coke was not above twisting the meaning of any original authority, including some 
idiosyncratic Latin translations, there is early authority dating back to before Magna Carta, and 
therefore before the creation of parliament, to the effect that the monarch may not create any law 
which alters the common law. In feudal times this was probably observed more in the breach 
than in the observance. See Prosser and Sharp Short Constitutional History 3. 
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was unlawful and constituted an offence. Coke emphasised that: "... the law of 
England is divided into three parts, common law, statute law, and custom; but the 
King's proclamation is none of them…' All in all, Coke's decision was a slap in the 
face for the King, and severely limited his royal prerogative. The judgment is a 
classic endorsement of the doctrine of legality and the rule of law. Although there is 
no overt reference to the separation of powers, the case certainly enforces this 
important principle of constitutional democracy.  
 
4  Comparing 17th Century England with 21st Century South Africa 
 
At first blush any insights into the doctrine of the separation of powers which may be 
gained by comparing the clash between a monarch aspiring to absolute power and 
his Chief Justice in 17th century England, with the present friction between the 
executive and judiciary in contemporary South Africa, may seem to be limited. After 
all, the clash in England took place at a time when the doctrine of the divine right of 
kings was influential and English democratic institutions were still at a relatively early 
stage of their development. Despite the conceptual and temporal distance between 
17th century England and present-day South Africa, however, the problems faced by 
these two societies were/are not entirely dissimilar. Like 17th century England, 
present-day South Africa is in the early stages of its democratic development. 
Democratic institutions are vulnerable and democratic practices not yet deeply 
entrenched. Friction seems inevitable as different centres of power jostle for position. 
Comparing the contentions of the respective executives of these two societies on the 
one hand and the arguments advanced by their respective judiciaries on the other is 
instructive.    
 
Both James I and Jacob Zuma regard the source of their authority to be self-evident 
and irrefutable. James, working from the premise of the divine right of kings, believes 
that he is duly anointed by God. Zuma, working from the premise of a simple 
majoritarian concept of democracy, believes his authority to be derived directly from 
'the people'.31 Each of these claims to authority is potent within its respective context. 
                                                          
31  Zuma is reported (direct quotes) to have stated, inter alia, as follows: "The powers conferred on 
the courts cannot be regarded as superior to the powers resulting from a mandate given by the 
people in a popular vote. We must not get a sense that there are those who wish to co-govern 
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At a time when society was in transition from the pre-modern to the modern, James' 
appeal to God still resonated with power. In post-apartheid South Africa, Zuma's 
reliance on the authority of 'the people' carries the imprimatur once enjoyed 
exclusively by holy writ. Indeed, Zuma has gone as far as to claim divine anointment 
for his particular political party:32 
 
When you vote for the ANC, you are also choosing to go to heaven. When you don't 
vote for the ANC you should know that you are choosing that man who carries a 
fork ... who cooks people. When you are carrying an ANC membership card, you 
are blessed. When you get up there, there are different cards used but when you 
have an ANC card, you will be let through to go to heaven .. When [Jesus] fetches 
us we will find [those in heaven] wearing black, green and gold [the ANC colours] ... 
the holy ones belong to the ANC. 
 
Whether or not Zuma was serious in the views set out above, his appeal to the divine 
certainly resonates with the arguments put forward by James discussed earlier. This 
curious mixture of appealing both to the people and the divine, a combination of 
modern and pre-modern-style arguments, is perhaps best captured by the old adage 
'Vox populi, vox Dei' - 'The voice of the people [is] the voice of God'.33  
 
Claims to authority from either God or 'the people' may be interrogated on a number 
of levels. At a superficial level, it may be argued that the claims of both James and 
Zuma rely heavily on fiction. One need hardly convince a modern audience that 
James' appeal to divine authority was based on fantasy. Although James' appeal to 
God was taken more seriously in his own time, even then it was open to challenge 
by members of the parliamentary gentry, many of whom regarded the doctrine of the 
divine right of kings as a fiction.34 At present, claims to divine authority as made by 
Zuma in the quotation set out above appear simply bizarre. Claims to authority from 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the country through the courts, when they have not won the popular vote during elections. We 
also wish to reiterate our view that there is a need to distinguish the areas of responsibility 
between the judiciary and the elected branches of the state, especially with regards (sic) to policy 
formulation. Our view is that the executive, as elected officials, has the sole discretion to decide 
policies for government." See Hartley 2011 www.bdlive.co.za. 
32  Ngalwa 2011 www.timeslive.co.za. 
33  The origin of the adage is not clear. It is referenced in a letter of Alcuin to Charlemagne of 798, 
but was clearly already in use. In the context of Zuma's claim to democratic authority and the 
authors' reliance on Dworkin's constitutional arguments, Alcuin's full statement is beguilingly 
apposite: 'And those people should not be listened to who keep saying the voice of the people is 
the voice of God, since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness.' See 
Wikiquotes Date Unknown en.wikipedia.org. 
34  Indeed, his son's persistence in this doctrine resulted in civil war and his son's beheading.  
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'the people' are more persuasive in the modern world, but upon further examination it 
may be argued that such claims are also based on a fiction. In the first place, it is 
clear that the executive does not derive its authority directly from the people but from 
the National Assembly.35 The president has no direct mandate from the electorate, 
but is dependent on the National Assembly for democratic legitimacy. Even his 
indirect democratic mandate, derived from his election by the National Assembly, is 
open to question. Members of Parliament are not given carte blanche in choosing 
who to elect as President, but have to follow instructions from their political parties. 
In reality today, the South African presidential 'candidate' is chosen by the 4500 odd 
members of the elective conference of the African National Congress.36 Furthermore, 
it may even be argued that the members of the National Assembly do not have direct 
electoral support, since they are appointed by parties which assign them to the seats 
each party is allotted in proportion to its share of the popular vote. Add to this the 
relatively low number of citizens who actually vote as a percentage of the total 
citizenry, and it becomes clear that the National Assembly can be said to reflect the 
will of 'the people' in an indirect sense only.37 All things considered, when it comes to 
claims by the South African executive to democratic authority derived from 'the 
people', General WT Sherman's adaptation of the adage set out in the previous 
paragraph may be more accurate than is generally admitted: 'vox populi, vox 
humbug'!38  
 
Apart from the arguments set out above, there is, potentially, a more fundamental 
problem with the arguments put forward by both James and Zuma. It may be argued, 
perhaps, that both James and Zuma misread the legal, political and economic history 
of the time at which they were/are living. James' arrival in a politically precocious 
England found him out of touch with a society well into a transition from the pre-
modern to the modern world. Monarchy in England was limited and a practical form 
                                                          
35  The president is voted into office by the National Assembly at its first meeting after a general 
election. See s 86 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
36  The elective conference members, in turn, are selected by the party. See De Vos 2012 
constitutionallyspeaking.co.za. 
37  The total number of votes cast nationally at the 2009 general elections was 17,919,966 out of a 
total population of 49,991,300. See IEC 2009 www.elections.org.za; Statistics SA 2009 
www.statssa.gov.za. 
38  Although he used it in a somewhat different context. William Tecumseh Sherman, the American 
Civil War general, loathed newspaper reporters and the newspaper-reading public, which he 
regarded as being 'the unthinking herd' (Baron 1987 www.nytimes.com). 
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of social contract was in operation.39 The economy reflected the growing power of 
the gentry and the middle class. In the light of these legal, political and economic 
realities, James' commitment to the doctrine of the divine right of kings was 
significantly out of place. Quite simply put, he was on the wrong side of history. 
Conversely, Edward Coke, James' antagonist in the two cases discussed earlier, 
articulates a view more in tune with the reality of the time. Coke's commitment to the 
rule of law, his view that the customs, statutes and common law of England were a 
'metwand' which served to guide and constrain the executive, were to prove more 
enduring than James' outdated belief in the divine right of kings. As to the arguments 
put forward by Jacob Zuma in contemporary South Africa, his appeal to the authority 
of 'the people' is not as clearly out of touch with contemporary South African realities 
as James' appeal to divine right was out of touch with the realities of 17th century 
England. Nevertheless, it may be argued that there is a significant disjuncture 
between Zuma's views and current global political and economic realities - at least to 
the extent that Western liberal democracy may still be said to be the dominant 
political and economic force in today's world. Implicit in Zuma's appeal to 'the people' 
is a commitment to a simple form of majoritarian democracy, which may be 
contrasted with more 'constrained' views of democracy.40 The arguments in favour of 
the latter view can best be articulated with reference to the work of the legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin.41    
                                                          
39  Fully articulated theories of social contract were to be formulated later during this century by 
theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. It had already been noted by political writers 
of the 15
th
 (Sir John Fortescue in 1469) and 16
th
 centuries (Sir Thomas Smith in 1589), however, 
that the English government consisted of what would be called a limited monarchy today. 
40  On 13 September 2012 a verbal spat in the South African Parliament seemed to confirm a 
somewhat simplistic majoritarian view of democracy on the part of President Zuma. Addressing 
Members of Parliament, President Zuma was reported to have stated, inter alia, as follows: 'You 
have more rights because you're a majority; you have less rights because you're a minority. 
That's how democracy works …' See Sapa 2012 www.timeslive.co.za. This comment provoked 
an uproar from the opposition members of parliament on the grounds the president did not 
properly understand the principles of democracy.  
41  In a brief article such as this it is not possible to deal with each and every conception of 
democracy which may be said to provide an alternative to the simple 'majoritarian' conception 
thereof. We deal with just one such alternative in the form of Ronald Dworkin's classic liberal 
conception of constitutional democracy. While Dworkin's theory is not undisputed (see, for 
example, Karl Klare's much quoted essay (Klare 1998 SAJHR), it is submitted that it stands in 
the centre of the theoretical mainstream, acting as an important foundation stone underpinning 
modern global, liberal and 'Western-style' conceptions of democracy. In addition to its status as a 
'classic' theoretical justification of modern liberal constitutionalism, Dworkin's work speaks 
directly to the issue of 'majoritarian democracy' vs 'constitutional democracy', making it a useful 
comparative tool. South Africa's current democracy may not, in all respects, follow the model of a 
classic 'liberal democracy', but it is submitted that it is strongly rooted in a liberal ethos. Theunis 
Roux, for example, explains his view on the nature of South Africa's Constitution as follows:  'If 
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Ronald Dworkin is, perhaps, the preeminent defender of liberal constitutional 
democracy alive today. Dworkin's theory of what constitutes a true liberal 
constitutional democracy provides an interesting contemporary counterpoint to 
Coke's early idea that the English common law is a 'golden metwand' which of 
necessity constrains and guides the powers of the king. It also provides a strong 
counter to arguments in favour of a simple majoritarian view of democracy such as 
that put forward by President Jacob Zuma. In his seminal work Freedom's Law, 
Dworkin uses the metaphor of a 'sail' to describe the Constitution of the United 
States of America:42 
 
The Constitution is America's moral sail, and we must hold to the courage of the 
conviction that fills it, the conviction that we can all be equal citizens of a moral 
republic. That is a noble faith, and only optimism can redeem it.  
 
Dworkin argues in favour of a 'moral reading' of the American Constitution. This 
treats the constitution 'as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be 
applied to concrete cases through fresh moral judgments.'43 Indeed, Dworkin 
believes that there is no alternative but to read the constitution in this way. An 
unavoidable consequence is that political morality is brought into the heart of 
constitutional law.44  
 
Acknowledging that political morality lies at the heart of constitutional interpretation 
comes with a cost. If a small group of unelected judges are given the task of 
constitutional interpretation (as is the case in the United States of America and South 
Africa) Dworkin's argument in favour of a 'moral reading' seems, on the surface at 
least, to invite controversy. As Dworkin states:45 
It seems grotesquely to constrict the moral sovereignty of the people themselves - 
to take out of their hands, and remit to a professional elite, exactly the great and 
defining issues of political morality that the people have the right and the 
responsibility to decide for themselves. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pressed, I would say that the Constitution is a liberal constitution of a particular type – certainly 
not a classic liberal constitution, but one that reflects the more statist and communitarian tradition 
within liberalism, and connects it with the indigenous African philosophy of ubuntu.' (Roux 2009 
Stell L R 280) 
42  See Dworkin Freedom's Law 38. 
43  Dworkin Freedom's Law 3. 
44  Dworkin Freedom's Law 2. 
45  Dworkin Freedom's Law  4. 
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It is for precisely the reason set out above that in countries like the United States of 
America, which have adopted a justiciable constitution, tensions are bound to arise 
between the executive and the judiciary when they differ on what the constitution 
requires. It is only natural for the executive to feel that it represents the democratic 
will of the people and to resent any curbs put in place by an unelected judiciary. 
Dworkin provides a number of historical examples of resentments on the part of past 
US presidents towards the judiciary.46 The key question, of course, is whether or not 
these resentments are justified. Although at first sight it may seem to be 
undemocratic for judges to have the power to set aside what a majority thinks is right 
and just, Dworkin asks if this is, in fact, the case. His somewhat counterintuitive 
answer is that it is not the case. He insists that, on a proper understanding of what 
'democracy' entails, there is nothing inherently undemocratic about a small group of 
judges having the last word on what the constitution requires.47  
 
How then should we understand the requirements of a 'democracy'? As a crucial 
starting point Dworkin distinguishes between two conceptions of democracy: a 
"constitutional conception of democracy" and a simple "majoritarian conception of 
democracy". According to Dworkin, the latter conception holds that "it is a defining 
goal of democracy that collective decisions always or normally be those that a 
majority or plurality of citizens would favour if fully informed or rational."48 
'Constitutional democracy', on the other hand, holds that the defining aim of 
democracy is 'that collective decisions be made by political institutions whose 
structure, composition, and practices treat all members of the community, as 
individuals, with equal concern and respect.'49 Dworkin prefers the latter conception 
                                                          
46  In relation to President Eisenhower Dworkin states: 'When Dwight Eisenhower, who denounced 
what he called judicial activism, retired from office in 1961, he told a reporter that he had made 
only two big mistakes as President – and that they were both on the Supreme Court.' (see: 
Dworkin Freedom's Law 5). In relation to Presidents Reagan and Bush, Dworkin states: 
'Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush were both profound in their outrage at the 
"usurpation" of the people's privileges. They said they were determined to appoint judges who 
would respect rather than defy the people's will.' (see Dworkin Freedom's Law 5). 
47  He states as follows: 'I do not mean that there is no democracy unless judges have the power to 
set aside what a majority thinks is right and just. Many institutional arrangements are compatible 
with the moral reading, including some that do not give judges the power they have in the 
American structure. But none of these varied arrangements is in principle more democratic than 
others. Democracy does not insist on judges having the last word, but it does not insist that they 
must not have it.' (see Dworkin Freedom's Law 7). 
48  Dworkin Freedom's Law 17. 
49  Dworkin Freedom's Law 17. 
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to the former - i.e. what he calls the 'constitutional conception of democracy' to the 
simple 'majoritarian conception of democracy'. The reasons for Dworkin's aversion to 
'majoritarian democracy' are crucially important for the purposes of this article, since 
they serve to counter arguments raised by members of the ruling African National 
Congress and its alliance partners that judicial constraint of the executive is out of 
order because the executive has the mandate of the majority within South African 
society.  
 
Dworkin believes that a 'true democracy' (i.e. a democracy defined according to the 
'constitutional conception' which takes as its essence the equal status of all citizens) 
requires all individuals within society, including the members of minority groups, to 
be in a position to claim 'moral membership' of the entire group. For Dworkin all the 
members of a 'true democracy' must be 'moral members' of the society in question. 
'Moral membership' does not simply mean that one is in possession of equal voting 
rights together with all the other members of one's society - but something more. 
What it means is that one's society meets certain 'democratic conditions' which can 
also be called the 'conditions of moral membership'.50 A 'true democracy' can exist 
only where government defers to these 'democratic conditions', which place 
constraints upon the powers of the government.  
 
It is not possible to discuss in detail each of the 'democratic conditions' which 
Dworkin considers essential to the existence of a 'true democracy'. For the purposes 
of this article, however, it is useful to focus on certain 'relational conditions' identified 
by Dworkin, which form part of the said 'democratic conditions'. These relational 
conditions describe how a genuine political community must treat an individual if that 
individual is to be what Dworkin calls a true 'moral member' of that community. 
Unless all members of a community are true 'moral members' of that community, that 
community cannot be counted as a 'true democracy'. But what does it mean to be 
counted as a 'moral member' of a particular community? Dworkin maintains that: 'A 
political community cannot count anyone as a moral member unless it gives that 
                                                          
50  Dworkin points out that: 'German Jews were not moral members of the political community that 
tried to exterminate them, though they had votes in the elections that led to Hitler's 
Chancellorship, and the Holocaust was therefore not part of their self-government, even if a 
majority of Germans would have approved it.' (see Dworkin Freedom's Law 23). 
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person a part in any collective decision, a stake in it, and independence from it.'51 
The second and third requirements - i.e. that each moral member must have a 'stake 
in' as well as 'independence from' the collective decisions of his or her community - 
are of particular interest, and it is worth quoting Dworkin at some length on each of 
these points. In relation to the first point, i.e. that each moral member must have a 
'stake' in the collective decisions of his or her community, Dworkin states:52  
 
[T]he political process of a genuine community must express some bona fide 
conception of equal concern for the interests of all members, which means that 
political decisions that affect the distribution of wealth, benefits, and burdens must 
be consistent with equal concern for all. Moral membership involves reciprocity: a 
person is not a member unless he is treated as a member by others, which means 
that they treat the consequences of any collective decision for his life as equally 
significant a reason for or against that decision as are comparable consequences 
for the life of anyone else. So the communal conception of democracy explains an 
intuition many of us share: that a society in which the majority shows contempt for 
the needs and prospects of some minority is illegitimate as well as unjust.  
 
In relation to the second point, i.e. that each moral member must be 'independent' 
from the collective decisions of his or her community, Dworkin explains that:53 
 
The root idea we are now exploring - that individual freedom is furthered by 
collective self-government - assumes that the members of a political community can 
appropriately regard themselves as partners in a joint venture, like members of a 
football team or orchestra in whose work and fate all share, even when that venture 
is conducted in ways they do not endorse. That idea is nonsense unless it can be 
accepted by people with self-respect, and whether it can be depends on which 
kinds of decisions the collective venture is thought competent to make. An 
orchestra's conductor can decide, for example, how the orchestra will interpret a 
particular piece: there must be a decision of that issue binding on all, and the 
conductor is the only one placed to make it. No musician sacrifices anything 
essential to his control over his own life, and hence to his self-respect, in accepting 
that someone else has that responsibility, but it would plainly be otherwise if the 
conductor tried to dictate not only how a violinist should play under his direction, but 
what standards of taste the violinist should try to cultivate.  
 
Both of the ideas explored by Dworkin in the quotations set out above (i.e. having a 
'stake in' as well as 'independence from' the collective decisions of one's community) 
mean that, in a true democracy of the type Dworkin advocates, the power of the 
majority in society to dictate to the minority in society is strictly limited. This in turn 
means that the powers of the executive, even though it may have been elected by a 
                                                          
51  Dworkin Freedom's Law 24. 
52  Dworkin Freedom's Law 25. 
53  Dworkin Freedom's Law 25-26. 
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majority of the people in society, will be limited. In Dworkin's view, a true democracy 
is necessarily a limited democracy and he rejects completely the majoritarian 
conception of democracy:54 
 
We must set the majoritarian premise aside, and with it the majoritarian conception 
of democracy. It is not a defensible conception of what true democracy is ...  
 
For Dworkin a 'true democracy' is, in the final analysis, a community of independent 
individuals.55 Within such a democracy executive power is limited, despite the fact 
that the members of the executive may have been voted into office (although only 
indirectly in the case of South Africa) by a large majority of the people. After all, it 
stands to reason that if the power of the majority within a 'true democracy' is limited, 
then the power of any executive elected (directly or indirectly) by the majority in such 
a democracy must also be limited. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently 
undemocratic about a small group of judges enforcing the democratic limitations on 
the power of the executive, as long as the democratic limitations are effectively 
enforced. In fact, the democratic limitations on the power of the executive enhance 
the truly democratic character of a society. As Dworkin states in his most recent work 
Justice for Hedgehogs:56 
 
… a majority has no moral authority to decide anything unless the institutions 
through which it governs are sufficiently legitimate. Judicial review is one possible 
… strategy for improving a government's legitimacy - by protecting a minority's 
                                                          
54  Dworkin Freedom's Law 31. Dworkin's famous mentor Herbert Hart makes an analogous point 
when he states: 'It seems fatally easy to believe that loyalty to democratic principles entails 
acceptance of what may be termed moral populism: the view that the majority have the moral 
right to dictate how all shall live. This is a misunderstanding of democracy which still menaces 
individual liberty … The central mistake is the failure to distinguish the acceptable principle that 
political power is best entrusted to the majority from the unacceptable claim that what the 
majority do with that power is beyond criticism and must never be resisted. No one can be a 
democrat who does not accept the first of these, but no democrat need accept the second. Mill 
and many others have combined a belief in a democracy as the best - or least harmful - form of 
rule with the passionate conviction that there are many things which not even a democratic 
government may do. This combination of attitudes makes good sense, because, though a 
democrat is committed to the belief that democracy is better than other forms of government, he 
is not committed to the belief that it is perfect or infallible or never to be resisted.' (Hart Law, 
Liberty and Morality 79-80). 
55  Dworkin states as follows: 'Someone who believes in his own responsibility for the central values 
of his life cannot yield that to a group even if he has an equal vote in its deliberations. A genuine 
political community must therefore be a community of independent moral agents. It must not 
dictate what its citizens think about matters of political or moral or ethical judgment, but must, on 
the contrary, provide circumstances that encourage them to arrive at beliefs on those matters 
through their own reflective and finally individual conviction.' (see Dworkin Freedom's Law 26). 
56  Dworkin Justice for Hedgehogs 385. 
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ethical independence, for instance - and in that way securing a majority's moral title 
to impose its will on other matters.  
 
5  Conclusion 
 
A firm separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary is one of the 
fundamental cornerstones upon which the grand edifice which we call 'liberal 
constitutional democracy' is built. For better or worse, it is this model of democracy 
which South Africa adopted in 1994 as the country emerged from the totalitarian grip 
of apartheid. As the historical examples discussed in this article have shown, a 
distinguishing feature in the historical development of liberal constitutional 
democracy has been the fact that the judiciary has won for itself the right to 
adjudicate and finally decide upon the extent of its own powers, as well as those of 
the legislature and the executive. Any undue interference by the executive with this 
basic principle would be a cause for grave concern among those South Africans 
deeply committed to liberal constitutional democracy.  
 
In seventeenth-century England the appeal of King James I to authority based upon 
divine right was still extremely powerful. Social, political and economic forces at work 
in English society, however, were to favour the theory of the social contract over 
Stuart absolutism. The balance of social, political and economic forces in present-
day South Africa is not entirely clear. Whether or not a simple 'majoritarian 
conception' of democracy will prevail over what Ronald Dworkin refers to as a 
'constitutional conception' of democracy is open to question. 
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